This article offers an interpretive reconstruction of Heidegger's first reference to the
The answer is because, for Heidegger, this expression possesses positive, which is to say decisive, philosophical content-a point he seeks to draw forward when challenged in the 1966 Der Spiegel interview, however much he garbles just when it was that he added the parenthetical.5 Despite the explanation he goes on to offer (and the most salient point concerns how we go about identifying what he there terms a "real confrontation with the technological world"), such positive content nonetheless seems to remain indecipherable within the context of Heidegger's specific analyses in Introduction to Metaphysics. It does not seem possible to retrace the steps that connect the depth of creative insight that distinguishes that course with the sardonic tonality of remarks on the increased number of works on value generated by Nazi ideologues and Heidegger's affirmation of an "inner truth and greatness." Yet this is not the case. For when Heidegger uses this particular formulation in Introduction to Metaphysics he is quoting-and thereby presupposing-the entire supporting context of his first reference to the "inner truth of National Socialism." Phrased in a slightly different manner and also employing an included in the 1953 Niemeyer edition, advised him "to clarify some . . . and better develop what was actually meant by this sentence in the context of the time." Heidegger, whom Buchner describes as becoming "very angry" at this suggestion, responded with the statement: "That I cannot do: it would be a falsification of history. I said it that way then,-and if today's readers do not want to understand what was meant by it in the context of the whole lecture course, then I cannot help them." See Buchner, "Fragmentarisches," in Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger, ed. Günther Neske (Pfüllingen: Neske, 1977), 49. Despite this statementand it is largely based upon Heidegger's reply here that commentators have deemed his decision to retain this line "courageous"-Heidegger was in fact willing to edit out other political references from the lecture courses. See note 6, below.
abbreviation, this first reference took place exactly five months earlier within the context of a series of remarkable insertions, found in "The Rhine" portion of the handwritten manuscript of the 1934/35 Winter Semester lecture course Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine,"6 but has remained unknown for contingent reasons.
The typescript of the course collated by Fritz Heidegger and corrected by Heidegger makes clear that, in contrast to Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger made an editorial decision to omit several passages containing overt political content,7 including parenthetical sentences found on this 7 A comparative review of the manuscript against the Fritz Heidegger typescript and the current German edition reveals that Heidegger made an editorial decision to leave out some of the more political references from the course, though he does so in such an inconsistent manner that Ziegler, in mistaking the abbreviation "N.soz," could not have known Heidegger intended the parentheticals included on this manuscript page to be omitted for their political content. Needless to say, the contrast this poses to the editorial process to which Heidegger submitted Einführung in die Metaphysik invites every type of question as to what the text of a Heidegger lecture course is, since Heidegger here edited out a highly charged political reference that he did not in fact deliver as part of the course and that has arguably made its way back into the text only as a result of Ziegler's misidentification of the abbreviation "N.soz". However it was that Heidegger's editorial process took place for this particular passage, Heidegger chose not to edit out what for the time was the racialist expression "stammverwandtes Volk" (a people of related lineage) in referring to the metaphysical kinship between the Greeks and the Germans in their respective drives toward the origin (see ga 39: 205; gr, 187). Nor does he omit the historically specific comparison between the Führer and Christ, which Fritz Heidegger mistranscribes as "Führersein"-"the being of the Führer"-and which Ziegler replicates in the edited volume (see Manuscript dla 75.7074, p. 59; Typescript dla 75.7115, p. 142; ga 39: 210; gr, 192). Luise Krohn, who possessed a remarkably sensitive ear for Heidegger's political references, is correct in rendering this word as "Führertum" (Führerdom) (Krohn, dla 98.35.10, p. 103-25). Notably, both passages are shown to be insertions within the manuscript page. By contrast, the Fritz Heidegger typescript research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 particular manuscript page. When the editor for the Gesamtausgabe volume, Susanne Ziegler, returns to fill in these sentences, she mistakenly interprets Heidegger's handwriting in the abbreviation "N.soz" for "N.W," transcribing it in the edited volume as "Naturwissenschaft" or "natural science." (She has reasonable grounds for doing so.) The passage as it is found in the current third edition of the course thus reads: "Neu ist diese angeblich neue Wissenschaft nur dadurch, daß sie nicht weiß, wie veraltet sie ist. Mit der inneren Wahrheit der Naturwissenschaft [sic] hat sie vollends nichts zu tun. [This purportedly new science is new only by virtue of the fact that it does not know how antiquated it is. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the inner truth of natural science (sic)]" (ga 39: 195; gr, 178).8 I discovered Ziegler's error in the context of examining what the Deutsches Literaturarchiv catalogues as "Nachschrift," or lecture notes, put together by Luise Krohn, which were included as part of a review of archival documents undertaken for the English translation of the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course. Krohn's inclusion of manuscript page numbers indicate that these "lecture notes" are, instead, an independently generated copy of "The Rhine" portion of the manuscript made prior to the presentation of that part of the course in January 1935;9 the philological and philosophical analysis of this passage shows that she correctly transcribes the abbreviation as "Nationalsozialismus." Student notes confirm Heidegger did not actually read out the parenthetical referring to National Socialism as part of his actual lecture, which is consistent with the way he treated the reference from Introduction to Metaphysics.10 While the omission of the bracketed sentences already goes far in confirming the fact of their political content, and the further review of Heidegger's page numbers, beginning with Heidegger's "Transitional Overview and Summary" (ga 39: §11; gr, §11), indicate that she was making a copy from the handwritten manuscript of "The Rhine" portion of the course. This is confirmed by Krohn's correct and sometimes corrected transcription of the word "Seyn," as well as her completeness and accuracy when compared against both Hallwachs' lecture notes and the Fritz Heidegger typescript. Her inclusion of Heidegger's "More Incisive Review" (ga 39: Zweites Kapitel; gr, chap. 2) as an independently numbered set of pages at the end of her notebook further suggests that she copied what Heidegger had already written out as the completed manuscript of "The Rhine" portion of the course prior to its having been delivered with the resumption of the Winter Semester in January 1935; Heidegger would have first written such a review within the context of his actually delivering the course, and there are several transpositions of blocks of text within Krohn's copy that point to Heidegger's later substitution of revised manuscript pages. A letter to Elisabeth Blochmann dated December 21, 1934 , indicates that Heidegger had already "worked out the ['Germania' and 'The Rhine'] lecture course in its entirety" and that it was available for Blochmann to read (ga 16: 336). With the exception of these transposed portions of text, Krohn's clear disinterest in Heidegger's brief discussions of Christianity in that "Review" in which she indicates sentences she has left out with ellipses (this is something she does not do in copying "The Rhine" manuscript), and her omission of sentences that she cannot read and other reasonable errors, her copy of "The Rhine" portion of the course corresponds exactly to both the handwritten manuscript and the Fritz Heidegger typescript. 10 Student lecture notes by Wilhelm Hallwachs, Alfred Bergstrausser, and Siegfried Bröse reveal Heidegger did not read the two-sentence parenthetical referring to National Socialism as part of the lecture course. However, Hallwachs' notes show Heidegger did read the first parenthetical referring to "so-called liberal objectivity" that directly prompts the insertion of his reference to the "inner truth of National Socialism," though he does so out of order in reading it at the very end of his first long insertion (Hallwachs, dla 84.2124, p. 176). Bergstrausser's notes, which he typed up later and are also the most fragmentary of the three, are important for recording the rhetorical tonality of the way Heidegger delivered this part of the lecture. When Bergstrausser renders this passage he both puts this section in parentheses and includes the following note: In this respect, Ziegler's mistaken transcription provides the critical philosophical clue. For the interpretive reconstruction of the passage shows that the phrase the "inner truth of natural science" not only fails to make basic sense, but the meaning of these paragraphs reveals it is not a possible formulation for Heidegger; indeed, precisely his point in adding the insertion is that "natural science" is not capable of possessing an "inner truth." This is of particular significance for understanding the larger implications of this discovery, which are not about the excavation of another reference to National Socialism within Heidegger's philosophical corpus. Instead, the contrast between the way the "inner truth of natural science" does not make coherent sense and the way the "inner truth of National Socialism" does-and Introduction to Metaphysics merely confirms this-reveals that the locus of this difference lies in the distinction Heidegger draws between φύσις and natural science apropos "this purportedly new science," which in the context of the time meant "political 11 Based on the passage from Introduction to Metaphysics I originally thought the abbreviation read "n.s". Before turning to what prompts Heidegger to add the reference to the "inner truth of National Socialism," I want to present a schematic overview of the layout of the manuscript page in order to contextualize where each insertion fits within the conceptual framework of what I will be referring to as 'Heidegger's initial long insertion.' ("Appendix B" is a reproduction of the manuscript page; "Appendix C" is a rendering of this same page in English, with bracketed numbers corresponding to the conceptual moves outlined below.) In considering the reproduction, one must recall that the concluding manuscript pages from Introduction to Metaphysics-including the page referring to the "inner truth and greatness of Heidegger's initial long insertion begins with the sentence, "For precisely the metaphysical meaning of Nature-natura-φύσις . . ." (Appendix C; see portion marked [1]) and extends to his call for a "more original" fundamental experience of beyng than what was expressed by the Greeks in the "word and concept φύσις." The points at which Heidegger runs out of space reveals he had written out this first long insertion and then added the further insertions included within it. And, indeed, the writing of the two insertion symbols directly on top of one another [2] shows that Heidegger intervened midsentence to add the bracketed sentences referring to the "inner truth of N.soc" [3] and then has to make the transition back to what he had originally written, which he does with the inclusion of the sentence fragment, "If, therefore, we today set ourselves the task . . ." [4] . Instead of reading the two insertion symbols' literally being written on top of one another as indicating Heidegger's later intervention within a continuous movement of thought, Ziegler includes a paragraph break at exactly this juncture in her effort to render this passage in a coherent manner. This has the effect of making Heidegger's subsequent quotation of the "three duties" outlined in the "Rectoral Address" and revised in the context of his lecture course on Hegel [5] read in a manner curiously out of place and digressive.15 In contrast to the paragraph break, I want to suggest that Heidegger's addition of the parenthetical referring to the "inner truth of National Socialism" functions as a 'caesura' within his initial long insertion. It breaks his original train of thought into two parts, each of which it comments on differently in the manner of what is both a logical progression and a discontinuous amplification whose transition-and, more importantly, whose gap or unsaid-is the relationship between that "inner truth" and the possibility of an "other metaphysics" governed by a more original naming of φύσις.
The conceptual moves Heidegger makes in this initial insertion may be outlined in the following manner:
Natural science is a metaphysically derivative understanding of the Greek interpretation of Nature as φύσις. 2. The denaturing of Nature that takes place in modern science has "recoiled back onto our conception of science in general" and has led to the science we have "today" as the organized business of knowledge. Two further notes are required here: First, Heidegger writes the clarificatory phrase, "thus not only natural science" [6] above this particular sentence, abbreviating the word "Naturwissenschaft" as "Naturwiss." Fritz Heidegger transcribes the abbreviation as the plural, "natural sciences," which context and philosophical sense suggest is incorrect. I believe this error, together with Heidegger's difficult to decipher handwriting, informs Ziegler's misidentification of "N.soz" as "n.w." Second, in its contemporary context the word "today" possessed ideological connotations and had an idiomatic force Heidegger deployed in critically ironic fashion 15 At the very top of the manuscript page Heidegger adds the insertion: "This [new fundamental experience of beyng] entails: 1. transformation in the essence of truth, 2. transformation in the essence of labor." The detailed discussion of Heidegger's revision of the "three duties" outlined in the "Rectoral Address" exceeds what I am able to accomplish in a single article. However, the clue to deciphering this particular insertion is to be found in ga 86: §207, "The Metaphysical Power of the State to Come," in which Heidegger explicitly connects truth and labor while referencing content from the "Germania" and "The Rhine" lecture course.
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throughout the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course. In both this passage and the passage from Introduction to Metaphysics, the most important word for communicating tone-and, consequently, for situating the historically specific nature of Heidegger's references to National Socialismis the word "today," repeated with shifting valences and used to describe the then current situation of science with a view toward the ideological production of scholarship. 3. The various stances taken toward "so-called liberal objectivity" are inadequate for transforming "today's science" because science can never be transformed by science but only by "an other metaphysics." The unique but also private resonance possessed by Heidegger's rejection of both the stance that affirms "so-called liberal objectivity" and the one that denies it prompts his insertion of the sentence referring to the "new science" ("new science" as coded language for "political science"). As I later address, the structure of this double-rejection occasions Heidegger's positive drawing of the distinction between the racially determined "new science" and the φύσις-governed "inner truth of National Socialism." 4
This "other metaphysics" is possible only on the basis of a "new fundamental experience of beyng" that must be "more original" than that named by the Greek word φύσις. It is precisely Hölderlin's inceptiveand inaugurally German-naming of Nature as "intimacy" that Heidegger next takes up in his interpretation of the breaking off of the flow of the Rhine river as it turns back toward its origin in the German fatherland. The word "more original" is therefore to be taken literally as the entering into explicit relation with the origin, which Heidegger understands to be enacted in Hölderlin's poetizing of the flow of the Rhine and in his own confrontation with φύσις in Introduction to Metaphysics.
Keeping in mind this logical succession, I want to now turn to a commentary on Heidegger's initial long insertion, focusing on the metaphysically derivative status of natural science with respect to what Heidegger characterizes as the "primordially inceptive naming force" of φύσις. line "Demigods now I think" (ga 39: §13; gr, §13), and begins in this lecture to transition to his interpretation of the course of the Rhine as it diverges in its easterly flow to turn back toward its origin in Germany. Heidegger's intervention within what began as an otherwise schematic review thus takes place at a particularly vulnerable moment within the lecture course as a whole, anticipating his later topology of the origin in which he equates the "breaking off" (Aufbruch) of the course of the Rhine with the necessity of the Germans' rupture from the Greeks through the new naming of Nature he believes to have been most fully accomplished in "The Rhine" hymn itself (ga 39: 255; gr, 231).
There, Heidegger's use of the German word "Aufbruch" is ambiguously used to capture both the divergence of the Rhine as well as the Germans' metaphysical-political 'awakening,' which establishes them as a "people of related lineage" to the Greeks in their "primordial drive toward the origin" (ga 39: 205; gr, 187). Though Heidegger had briefly touched on Hölderlin's rivers in the "Germania" portion of the course, the difficulty he encounters at this juncture relates to the problem of gaining interpretive access to the counter-turning of the Rhine as "historical" (geschichtlich). As the unrevised portion of the manuscript page shows, this difficulty is situated by the tendency to approach Nature in the poem in objective terms, which preempts carrying through on what it means for Hölderlin's rivers to be "taken for themselves" (selbst gemeint). While these objective terms include the apparatus of literary science that occasions Heidegger's final and tellingly parallel reference to φύσις later in the course, the succession of insertions on the manuscript page makes clear that what most concerns him here is not the interpretation of the rivers as " 'images'" but their treatment as one domain in the "field of objects for the natural sciences." It is this reference to the "natural sciences" that prompts Heidegger to introduce the distinction between φύσις and natural science that governs the entire insertion, including his later addition of the parenthetical referring to the "inner truth of National Socialism."
In crossing out what he had originally written to make a point about how natural science "denatures Nature," Heidegger returns to two interrelated claims he made early in the course concerning the way natural science "leaves us in the lurch" in approaching the poetic conception of Nature. As Heidegger there writes-and in anticipation of Derrida-his reference to "our questioning" concerns why animals do not talk:
We shall first approach our questioning here if we ponder fundamentally how poetizing as the fundamental event of the historical Dasein of human beings relates-if we may put things in this way at all-to Nature, prior research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 to all natural science [vor aller Naturwissenschaft]. The whole of natural science-indispensable though it is within certain present day limits, for instance for the manufacture of rubber and the alternating current-for all its exactness leaves us fundamentally in the lurch here regarding what is essential because it de-'natures' Nature. (ga 39: 76; GR, 68-69)
Heidegger's first and most important claim is that historical Dasein's relationship to Nature is "prior" (vor) to natural science. Yet as his carefully qualified wording signals, this priority is not one of objective relation. Rather, poetizing as the opening up of beings in their totality (and this totality is in fact what Heidegger means by "Nature") implicates the disclosure of Nature within the disclosure of Dasein's Da at the same time that it constitutes Nature as historical through language. What Heidegger can only misleadingly articulate as "relation to"-it is instead the event of relation per se or what Heidegger takes up through Hölderlin as "intimacy"-is the paradoxical, because temporally inceptive, simultaneity of the poetic revelation of Nature and the inauguration of Dasein as historical. This priority in turn informs Heidegger's second claim, namely, that Nature remains inaccessible to the "whole of natural science" not because of its failure to be exact but because its very exactness "de-'natures' Nature" by picturing it solely in terms of change of location to which numerical values might be assigned. It is thus no accident that Heidegger's examples here treat a war industry as equivalent with the electrical current (and this same logic extends to "world commerce," "industrialization," and "machine technology" on the manuscript page); each derives from mathematical physics as the basis for Heidegger's confrontation with technology during this period.
When, however, Heidegger felt himself compelled to intervene within what he had already written on the manuscript page, something deeper was at stake than the language of being "left in the lurch" suggests. For at issue is not just the constitution of the exact but the fact that the objective orientation of natural science is metaphysically derivative, and metaphysically derivative in a manner itself constitutive of natural science. As is evident in his truncated genealogy, Heidegger interprets the denaturing of Nature by the alien powers of Christendom and modern science to have literally "recoiled" back onto the conception of "science in general." This recoil not only implicates the notion of truth operative in natural science-as such, it is an important dimension of Heidegger's remark about "so-called liberal objectivity"-it also impacts the science operative "today" as what Heidegger terms the "organized business of procuring and transmitting knowledge" (ga 39: 195; gr, 178). (As a further addendum to the manuscript page, it is worth remarking that Heidegger had originally written "Wissensförderung" before crossing it out and replacing it with the word "Wissensbeschaffung" [procuring knowledge], suggesting that the distinguishing feature of this recoil is the "challenging forth" of knowledge primarily for the sake of its organization through which it is secured in being delivered as knowledge. Whence Heidegger's preoccupation in both the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course and Introduction to Metaphysics with the National Socialist infatuation with collected anthologies and bibliographies, and the instituting of new journals and periodicals.) In preempting interpretive access to Hölderlin's rivers as historical, the objective stance adopted by natural science preempts access to that naming of Nature whose inceptive priority places it disjunctively before-and therefore interruptively alongsidenatural science as the locus of "an other metaphysics." To interpret Hölderlin's rivers either ecologically or metaphorically (and this amounts to the same thing) is to fall subject not to just any kind of metaphysical error, it is to be cut off from the Hölderlinian naming of Nature as the only possible basis for what might be termed a "new science."
Such interruptive priority is best approached in connection to what Heidegger characterizes on the manuscript page as the "primordially inceptive naming force" of φύσις. Though Heidegger does not offer an analysis of φύσις anywhere in the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course (he uses the Greek word only five times, but each use suggests the extent to which his interpretation of "The Rhine" is in dialogue with the Introduction to Metaphysics), the distinctiveness of the formulation "Nature-natura-φύσις" recalls the second lecture of his 1933/34 Winter Semester Übung, "On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History, and State."16 After rejecting its Latin rendering with "natura" (getting born) together with its conventional translation as "growth" (wachsen), Heidegger offers a series of translations each of which aims to bring forward the meaning of φύσις as that which "comes forth" or is "moved by itself" (das Von-Sich-Selbst-Herkommen, das von-Selbst-Bewegtsein) (ngs, 60-61). In attempting to reorient interpretation from a narrow conception of "process" (Vorgang) or "development" to the essence of growth as the "by-itself" of creative origination, Heidegger seeks to shift the predominant understanding of φύσις as referring solely to natural phenomena to "something that created itself," which he states presented itself at the inception of Greek philosophy as the "whole of being as by-itself " (das Ganze des Seins als Von-selbst). At this point, the specific disclosivity of the word φύσις becomes important within the overall arc of Heidegger's interpretation. Returning to the distinction he introduced at the end of the first lecture and that can be seen to structure the entire progression of the Übung, Heidegger claims that φύσις "grasps as one" (in eins faßt) both the formal and the material concept of Naturethough he importantly clarifies that the material concept of Nature "presupposes" the formal concept of Nature and is "encompassed" by it in the same way that growth as process presupposes and is encompassed by the essence of growth as what is moved by itself. Thus where the formal concept of Nature refers to something's "kind of being," the material concept of Nature designates the "what-being of a being" that within the larger context of the Übung allows it to be assigned to the domains of "Nature," "history," or "state" as they are successively demarcated from one another by a temporality Heidegger in each case seeks to distinguish from natural processes.
Within the context of describing the peculiar unity of this doubling-intoone of the formal and the material, Heidegger twice uses the formulation "φύσις-natura-Nature" writing: "In the same way [that growth presupposes that something is], Nature tells of what its things are and how they are. The simultaneous unity inherent in such doubling harbors the miracle of language [Solche in eins fallende Doppelung birgt das Wunder der Sprache]" (ngs, 61). The wondrousness of the actual word φύσις is to be found in the disclosive structure of its "double-interpretive possibility," which makes manifest the being of beings in their totality while at the same time giving expression to the how of beings' emergence as what they are (τὸ τὶ ἑστι). Φύσις, which Heidegger decisively emphasizes is a "domain" of Dasein, may therefore be understood to name the irruption of the ontological difference as it is articulated in terms of the creative origination of beings and thought in accordance with a temporality that derives from the structure of Dasein's own disclosivity.
Introduction to Metaphysics recapitulates a version of these same points in seeking to recuperate what Heidegger, in a direct echo of the manuscript page, characterizes as the "authentically philosophical naming force" of φύσις and as its "undestroyed naming force" (ga 40: 15-6; im, 14-15). (Yet despite his repetition of this key word, Heidegger's analysis intimates that he understands this naming power to have been if not destroyed, then, with the Latin translation of natura, at least cut off from its root. If the recoil of knowledge into organized industry takes place through the translation of φύσις, so too does its recovery, beginning with its rendering as the "emerging and abiding of what prevails" [das aufgehende-verweilende Walten], whose interpretive violence Heidegger intends as a corrective to an ambiguity in the Greek that enables Nature to become physicalism on its way to mathematical physics.) In refining his own translation, Heidegger again asserts that the coming forth by itself of φύσις is not equivalent to the "processes" that "we today" count as part of "nature." He then uses this strong distinction between emergence and process as the means to transition to the inceptive priority of the poetic conception of Nature-he here calls it "a poetizing-thinking fundamental experience of being"-which, in first making beings visible in their coming into appearance, in turn makes beings "observable" (beobachtbar) in the objective sense presupposed by modern science. I quote at length because in its reference to "the gods as themselves standing under destiny," this passage serves as the further commentary on the line from Hölderlin's hymn "As when on a feast day . . . ," "For she [Nature], she herself, more ancient than the times / And beyond the gods of Occident and Orient," that prompts Heidegger's final reference to φύσις in the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course:
Not in natural processes did the Greeks first experience what φύσις is, but the other way around: on the basis of a poetizing-thinking fundamental experience of being, what they had to name φύσις disclosed itself to them [aufgrund einer dichtende-denkende Grunderfährung des Seins erschloß sich ihnen das, was sie φύσις nennen mußten]. Only on the basis of this disclosure could they then take a look at nature in the narrower sense. Thus φύσις originally means both heaven and Earth, both the stone and the plant, both the animal and the human, and human history as the work of humans and gods; and finally and first of all, it means the gods who themselves stand under destiny. Φύσις means what prevails in its emerging and the perduring of that through which it prevails. This emerging, abiding sway includes both "becoming" as well as "being" in the narrower sense of fixed continuity. (ga 40: 17; im, 15-16)
In disclosing beings as a whole, the having to name φύσις that takes place in the Greeks' poetizing-thinking first allows Nature to appear in the more narrowly circumscribed sense of the 'natural world.' Heidegger's listing of what is encompassed by φύσις in terms of a "both-and"-this importantly includes human history as well as the delimitation of "being" and "becoming"-stands research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 in contrast to a "field of objects" in bringing forward the differential ordering of beings according to their emerging and temporal perduring as this can become manifest only through the revelation of beings in their totality. And, indeed, Heidegger's striking equation of Nature with destiny, of the prevailing of "walten" later interpreted in his analysis of Sophocles as "das Überwältigende" (the overwhelming), is essential for following out the relationship between φύσις and δίκη (Fug, ordering enjoining) through which Heidegger rejects the National Socialist interpretation of Nature as biological law in favor of a Nietzschean/Heraclitean conception of rank.
Where Introduction to Metaphysics makes clear that the Greek naming of φύσις sustained its double-interpretive possibility up through Aristotle's Metaphysics, Heidegger understands the Latin translation of φύσις as natura to have coincided with its demotion in Christianity to "something created," which means to something rationally thought out in advance by God (ga 40: 202; im, 207). The denaturing of Nature by the alien powers of Christendom and modern science thus form a continuous historical narrative-the conceptual transformation that takes place in the former prepares for the latter-at the same time Heidegger interprets mathematical physics to mark an essential departure from Christianity in securing the sovereignty of thinking over being as "calculability" (Rechnung). In the coincidence of its Latin translation and Christian reinterpretation as "something created," the "narrow" meaning of φύσις finally eclipses its "original" meaning, thereby covering over the eventful connection between the miracle contained in the disclosive structure of the actual word φύσις and the insight into creative origination it captures as a fundamental experience of being. Though this point is largely implicit in Heidegger's reference to " 'becoming'" in the above quotation, the covering over of the itself sufficient formal meaning of φύσις by its material meaning results in a modification in the interpretation of φύσις as "growth." Thus where Heidegger's analysis in "On the Essence and Concept of Nature, History, and State" indicates that the essence of growth as "getting bigger" (größer werden, literally "to become more") retains its connection to φύσις as creative selforigination, with its wholly material interpretation Nature qua "growth" comes to be understood as "development" or "process," whose assigning of time as a constant allows it to be modeled mathematically as change of location.
In addition to clarifying in what sense natural science is metaphysically derivative, Heidegger's insistence on the priority of the original meaning of φύσις connects the opening up of a fundamental experience of being to what is best characterized as the 'compulsion to name.' This compulsion, which Heidegger already interpreted in the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course as the articulation of being's "need," is to be understood as the violent rupture into language that internally connects the creative revelation of Nature with poetry's very power to disclose beings in their totality. As the unusualness of the middle-voiced construction "erschloß sich ihnen" (disclosed itself to them) signals, a fundamental experience of being does not take place outside of language; it is not 'pre-linguistic' in any conventional philosophical sense. Rather, Nature opens itself up to a poetizing-thinking whose transitivity or being 'set into motion' is itself a manifestation of the way language is co-responsive with that opening up, which is evidenced precisely in the reflexivity of the Greeks' "having to name" Nature. Yet it is precisely in this compulsion's not originating from Dasein that language derives its naming force through Dasein's being opened up to what is first disclosed through it and inaugurates it as historical. Introduction to Metaphysics takes this up as the disclosively reciprocal, but inceptively asymmetrical, relationship between φύσις and λόγος, which Heidegger expresses toward the conclusion of Introduction to Metaphysics in the formulation: "φύσις = λόγος ἄνθροπον ἔχον: being, the overwhelming appearing, necessitates [ernötigt] the gathering that pervades and grounds beinghuman (accusative)" (ga 40: 184; im, 187).
Heidegger's statement about the Greeks' "hav[ing] to name φύσις" was already informed by his interpretation of Hölderlin's fragmentary hymn "As when on a feast day . . ." in the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course, which Heidegger addressed in answering the question why poetry "has to unveil" (enthüllen müssen) Nature (ga 39: §19c; gr, §19c). Heidegger's analysis of this hymn, which is also the most important for understanding the poet's vocation, prompts his final reference to φύσις in the course in a manner whose schematic moves exactly parallel to the manuscript page, beginning with his "warding off" interpreting the hymn's opening as the "poetic depiction of a process of nature" and thus a "poetic comparison" (dichterischer Vergleich). (In direct homage to Pindar, the opening of the hymn's first two strophes reads, "As when on a feast day, to see the field a countryman goes . . . / So they [the poets] stand under favorable weather. . . ."). In contrast to the manuscript page's logic of insertions, Heidegger's analysis here is governed by an immense rhetorical compression that tends to bury rather than bring forward his operative conceptual distinctions: His targeting of "poetic comparison" occasions a critique of the misguidedness of "traditional poetics," whose predominantly Christian interpretive categories-he specifies both "image" and "metaphor"-indicate an inability to come to terms with the "essence of poetizing" (ga 39: 254; gr, 230). This critique next segues into a series of remarks on the derivative status of "today's literary science" (heutige Literaturwissenschaft), which, after taking a shot at psychoanalysis, conclude with the observation that "now everything Parallel to the manuscript page, Heidegger here links the contemporary but antiquated categories of literary science to the business of scholarship, which he ties to an ideologically-driven National Socialist program of knowledge. In both passages, the effect of the German word "angeblich" (purportedly) is to assert an ironic distance before scientific initiatives that, in failing to know the history of their own metaphysics, adopt the activity of sheer production as their standard of rigor. It is this that is then construed as "heroic." Heidegger also connects the production of knowledge to its organization (his reference to the "inner truth and greatness of [National Socialism]" in Introduction to Metaphysics is prompted by what he presumes is a sharp increase in works on the concept of value), with the added insight that such productions literally consume time, "even the effort of an entire generation." This subtle point is not to be overlooked in a lecture course in which the possible arrival of the new gods is undergone in the experience of the "essentially long" time as temporalizing the "world-time of peoples," which also requires generations (ga 39: 56; gr, 53). At this particular point, Heidegger returns to his concern that the hymn's opening will be treated as a "poetic comparison" at the same time he makes what appears a rhetorical leap in his critique of National Socialist ideology in posing the question, "Poetic comparison for . . . What is being compared to what? A process in nature to a lived experience in the spirit" (ga 39: 255; gr, 231). Though his answer initially picks up with the division between the sensuous and supersensuous as the basis for traditional poetics, his emphasis shifts from poetic comparison as a literary figure to the disclosivity of Nature with the question, " [O] f what use is comparison, if the poet says that Nature herself teaches the poet?" Anticipating his central interpretive claim, Heidegger understands what Introduction to Metaphysics called the "disclosing itself [of φύσις]" to be of the "same origin" and "same essence" as poetizing; Nature "teaches" the poet as the itself inaugurating event of poetic telling, whose founding of beyng takes place as the compulsion to name Nature, through which poetry simultaneously unveils the origin of its own activity in the disclosure of beings in their totality. Hence the connection in "As when on a feast day . . ." between Nature and the self-reflexivity with which Hölderlin calls attention to his vocation as poet. Commenting on how Nature is to be properly understood, Heidegger distinguishes between the Hölderlinian conception of Nature as the embracing of "intimacy" and what he derisively identifies as the "biological-organic worldview" before going on to draw the positive contrast between Greek φύσις and Hölderlin as the "future of the Germans":
The Nature of which Hölderlin tells here and in his poetic work as a whole is not the nature of landscape; Nature is also not the opposing domain to spirit or to history. Nature is here, as we might say quite vaguely and vacuously, the 'universal,' and yet not the primal soup or primal swamp and the bubbling over with which the biological-organic worldview ends and begins. Nature is the all-embracing. (ibid., ga 39: 255; gr, 231)
There are several points I want to emphasize about this passage in relationship to the manuscript page. First, Heidegger's resistance to treating Nature in "As when on a feast day . . ." as a "process in nature" or "the nature of landscape" derives from his distinction between the formal and the material concept of Nature. Poetic comparison, in order to function as a comparison, has to privilege nature in its material sense as the observable in order to then import a spiritual meaning into it. Though Heidegger's remarks appear to be merely a re-articulation of his earlier point about the denaturing of Nature by modern science, the figures employed by traditional poetics do not just preempt access to the Hölderlinian conception of Nature, they preempt access to Hölderlin's poetizing of the essence of poetry through which one gains such access as the realization of a transformed metaphysics. (And Heidegger understands the disclosive event implicit in that essence to be constitutive of the people not through Hölderlin's language as something objectively present but as the itself inaugural event of the German language and, consequently, of German national identity.) Relatedly, "Literaturwissenschaft" and "Naturwissenschaft" can function as rhetorically interchangeable because, in their objective orientation as "sciences," each is a manifestation of the denaturing of Nature and is therefore metaphysically derivative. What makes Heidegger's culminating connection between Nature and φύσις in this passage particularly significant is the convergence of the two in the ideological interpretation of poetry as the biological expression of the people. Such convergence not only reverses the order of priority between poetry and people-for Heidegger there is no people without the event of language realized through poetry-the ideologicallydriven natural science lends its veneer of rigor to literary science not through the imposition of its objective methods but by transforming the literary object into something political through the notion of race.
This leads to my final point: Hölderlin's new naming of Nature transforms not only the very possibility of the poetic but also the very possibility of the political. Heidegger's disavowal of "talk[ing] about the 'political'" in the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course is not some coy hedge but is a critical response to the fact, first, that "talk[ing] about 'the political'" was code for talking racial ideology and, second, that precisely such talk distracted attention from the genuine Aufbruch inaugurated by the naming force of φύσις. Heidegger's refusal to engage in politics while presenting the lecture course as its authentic enactment is indicative of his own fraught position, which, on the one hand, is already situated within Hölderlin's "other metaphysics" and, on the other, subordinates itself to an interpretive stance whose transformation he enacts as the alternative to both literary science and to racial biologism. Instead of operating out of the metaphysical divide between the sensuous and supersensuous, material and spiritual that determines traditional poetics, the "Germania" and "The Rhine" course attempts a 'poetics of φύσις.' And, indeed, the redundancy implicit in this phrase points up the decisive philosophical innovation that underlies the distinction between φύσις and natural science that begins Heidegger's initial long insertion on the manuscript page: Heidegger thinks ποίησις more originally from φύσις as the naming force inaugural of not only an "other metaphysics" but an "other" politics. In my schematic overview I pointed toward the significance of interpreting the parentheses that ambiguously bracket Heidegger's reference to the "inner truth of National Socialism." I now want to revisit the layout of the manuscript page as supplying the hermeneutical clue for deciphering the expression the "inner truth of National Socialism." For if Heidegger's reference to the "field of objects for the natural sciences" first prompted him to draw the distinction between φύσις and natural science, the question that next suggests itself is, What, within the logic of that initial insertion, prompts him to add a still further insertion, one in which he this time distinguishes between "this purportedly new science" and the "inner truth of National Socialism"? Still further, in what sense is this second distinction governed by Heidegger's initial distinction between φύσις and natural science?
The omission of the two sets of parenthetical sentences from the Fritz Heidegger typescript provides the key for answering the first question. While it is obvious why Heidegger would have bracketed the insertion referring to the "inner truth of National Socialism," thereby indicating his intention not to read these lines, it is by no means clear why he would have later added brackets to the sentence in his initial long insertion that reads: "Whether this business is kept in operation in the stance taken by so-called liberal objectivity, or in one that merely rejects that stance, alters nothing with regard to the shape of today's science as such" (ga 39: 195; gr, 178). In other words, Heidegger's bracketing and omission of both sets of sentences signals the relationship between them as specifically political, albeit in a manner whose historical context is gestured to so opaquely as to be non-existent for the contemporary reader. As such, the insertion of the parenthetical referring to the "inner truth of National Socialism" does not mark the addition of new content but Heidegger's filling in and making explicit what he understands to have already been implied in his next point about a "transformation in science as a whole." Read in terms of the graphic layout of the manuscript page, the parenthetical is a literal 'putting beside' whose prompt and specific point of reference is the "stance" that "merely rejects [so-called liberal objectivity]," which Heidegger is at pains to distinguish from his own rejection of liberalism.
While Heidegger's disparaging attitude toward liberalism has been amply commented upon (it is a central component of Faye's argument and a dimension of his curious apologia for Descartes), Heidegger's use of the expression "so-called liberal objectivity" (emphasis mine) is not the endorsement of his own general position but instead functions as a type of quotation in referring to what at the time served as a rhetorical set-piece within an academic com-research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 munity competing to provide the ideological framework that would bring the German university into line with Hitler's "new order." As the German philosopher and historian of logic Volker Peckhaus writes in his investigation of the " 'new concept' of science" as applied to mathematics:
The demand for a "new shaping of science within the German spirit" was, however, being mouthed by everyone, whether this demand was now directed against "liberalism" in science, which sought "to maintain its position under the guise of the objective and absolute science," or whether it aspired to a "renewal of science and thereby the university" against "intellectualism" and the "mania for objectivity." A distinguishing feature of "new science" was the adoption of its opposing position to all previous conceptions [of science].18
As Peckhaus elaborates, the rejection of the universal values of liberalism was employed to stage the affirmation of the "new science" without the ideological tenants of that science having been articulated beyond the constitutive dimension of its own rhetorical evocation and default recourse to racial biologism. (The latter notably led to the privileging of natural science as one of the "leading sciences" within the National Socialist university.) Indeed, Peckhaus' guiding insight is to use the conceptual incoherence that resulted when the "new science" was applied to the formally objective domain of mathematics as a lens for examining the disciplinary implications of an emergent ideology where the very status of mathematics as a "science" came to be predicated not on its objectivity but on its "scientific"-and this meant "political"-consolidation of a racial ideology that it had already assumed and that was applied to it as the measure of its standard of rigor.
The extent to which Heidegger's analyses in the early 1930s are situated in response to the "new science's" rejection of objective truth emerges at several junctures in the lecture courses included in the Gesamtausgabe volume Being and Truth (ga 36/37). In what he himself identifies as a startling move, Heidegger states the following about the validity of the principle of contradiction:
Showing that the law of being expressed by the principle of contradiction is unprovable and indisputable leads us back to the quite unexpected ground-unexpected for the entire conception, interpretation, and treatment of the axiom up to now. This ground in which its validity is grounded is human Dasein; and not that of man in general, but of historical man in the language-and people-bound, spiritually determined being-with-one-another of those who belong and are obligated to each other. The dominant fundamental reality of this being-with-one-another is language. (ga 36/37: 57-58; BTr, 46)
As this quotation indicates, Heidegger's placing into question the axiomatic status of the principle of contradiction aligns with the "new science's" rejection of objective truth, and does so in a way Heidegger directly links to a spiritual and "people-bound" (volkhaften) community. Yet what Heidegger signals as "unexpected" is not just the fact that the principle of contradiction is historically determinate but that it is historically determinate as grounded in "the existential structure of our Dasein in general" (ga 36/37: 58; BTr, 47). As the articulation of Dasein's Da, the principle of contradiction derives its validity through the way language "obligates" Dasein to others as a dimension of Dasein's disclosivity at the same time that the structure of that "obligation" or "belonging" takes the form of its validity. Similar to his analysis of "poetic legislation" in the ] is a political lecture course concerned with the "we" as a people.) Exactly this type of interpretation distinguishes Heidegger from the default recourse to the racial ideology of the "new science"; blood or ancestry is not a mode of being-with-one-another sufficient to constitute the binding Heidegger understands to comprise a people-it is not a mode of being-with-one-another at all.
Heidegger makes backhanded reference to the "new science" in a manner that directly anticipates the manuscript page in the 1933/34 lecture course, "On the Essence of Truth," though the precise way this passage operates is unfollowable in the absence of familiarity with the historical context. After asserting that the "essence of truth is essentially one with the essence of being" (and this immediately follows Heidegger's commentary on Fragment 53 by Heraclitus in which he claims that πόλεµος possesses not only an "edeictic" function but research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 an "epoetic" one in bringing beings into "visibility" and thus into the openness of truth), Heidegger writes that the "greatest obstacle" to following out this insight is the entire history of Western Dasein itself, "whose power becomes all the more obstinate as the great transformation of human Dasein arises in a more originary and irresistible manner." He continues:
At this point, it is getting embarrassing that there are more and more people who believe they have discovered that liberalism must be refuted. Certainly it should be overcome, but only when we comprehend that liberalism is just a marginal epiphenomenon, and a very weak and late one at that, rooted in still great and unshaken realities. And there is the danger that the overzealous killers of liberalism will quickly turn out to be the "agents" of a liberal National Socialism, which just drips with the naive and upright innocence of the youth movement. (ga 36/37: 119; BTr, 93-94)
Heidegger's disdain makes vivid that the opposition of the "new science" to liberalism is not only embarrassing-Peckhaus makes clear that the "new science" is distinguished precisely by its oppositional attitude-it is beside the point given the continued efficaciousness of the Western tradition. Indeed, in referring to its "obstinacy," Heidegger goes so far as to suggest that the "new science" is the final instantiation of that tradition-a point he underscores in referring to the "overzealous killers of liberalism" as " 'agents' of a liberal National Socialism" willing to call into question the objectivity of truth while simultaneously treating race as a transcendent category.
However, what needs to be emphasized is that the "new science's" rejection of truth as universal and objective to something to be founded in the "political," neither implies nor necessitates a confrontation with Dasein as the "ground of truth," much less the alethic eventfulness that connects the naming force of Nature to the historical configuring of truth through language. (And this connection would in fact designate what Heidegger understands by the word "Volk.") Yet as the manuscript page suggests, the denaturing of Nature that occurs in modern science enables the "new science" to evacuate the notion of objective truth while simultaneously installing in its place the interpretation of nature as process that had to be presupposed in order to first arrive at an objective conception of truth. This is key: As articulations of a denatured Nature, liberalism and the ascendency of natural science as race are coincident with one another and are metaphysically equivalent. Heidegger makes this point explicit when he writes in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) that "[o]nly a thoroughly modern (i.e. 'liberal') science can be a 'people's [völkisch] research in phenomenology 44 (2014) 315-346 nothing in regard to today's science," he is rejecting both liberal objectivity and the rhetorical-ideological gesture through which the "new science" rejects liberal objectivity as the means to affirm the "political" concept of the people as race. It is the structure of this double-rejection that occasions Heidegger's positive drawing of the distinction between the "new science" and the "inner truth of National Socialism." In answer to my second question, what governs this further distinction is the naming force of φύσις and its internal connection to truth as ἀλήθεια from out of which the notion of an "inner truth" must itself be thought. I want to conclude by raising a few points about the larger implications of this archival discovery and the direction I hope its wider scholarly engagement might take. First, the very fact of the discovery necessitates a reinterpretation of Heidegger's reference to the "inner truth and greatness of [National Socialism]" in Introduction to Metaphysics together with an examination of how that reference has been put to use in the secondary literature, where it has functioned as a 'floating signifier' in authorizing every kind of philological and philosophical claim. I believe that many of these claims-including the interpretation of this expression as a 'personal confession of faith' or the addition of the parenthetical referring to "global technology" as a retrospective interpolation-simply do not hold. It is a peculiarity of this discovery that its singular resonance derives from the fact that it is not unique and thereby both implies and supplies interpretive context. As I have shown, the logical succession of insertions on the manuscript page, beginning with the distinction Heidegger draws between φύσις and natural science and culminating with the demand for an "other metaphysics" he believes to have been accomplished through Hölderlin, provides the key to the interpretation of both references as sustainedly philosophical-and sustainedly philosophical in a manner that connects Heidegger's inaugural interpretation of poetic dwelling to a presuppositional critique of technology and racial ideology through the naming force of Nature.
Second, Heidegger's reference to "so-called liberal objectivity" in conjunction with the "new science" is historically specific and located within what at the time was an ideologically determined debate about the status of science and objective truth. A more historically informed examination of key volumes from the Gesamtausgabe will show that the majority of Heidegger's most controversial political references to National Socialism were themselves provoked by ideological initiatives or contemporary discourses specifically concerned with Wissenschaft. In this article I have shown how Heidegger's references to the "new science" and to Bäumler's " 'heroic science' " in each case prompts Heidegger's drawing of a distinction that situates his rejection of Nazi ideology while simultaneously (and this means protectively) gesturing toward the possibility of an "other" National Socialism determined by the new naming of Nature. Similarly, Heidegger's assertion of the "historical singularity of National Socialism" in the 1942 Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister" (ga 53) is prompted by a reference to Himmler's program of "scientific occupation" (Wissenschaftseinsatz), which was concerned with the discovery and establishment of a German-Aryan ancestral heritage. (Heidegger's interpretation of the πόλις in that lecture course is offered as an alternative to the retroactive National Socialist colonization of the Greeks, which transforms them into the original Germans precisely by way of the racial-ancestral connotations operative in the word "political.") In each of these instances a clearly identifiable schema is operative, one whose implicit and repeated set of connections points toward the unsaid locus of what Heidegger understands by the word "Nationalsozialismus." While the most thoughtful work on Heidegger's politics has begun to fill in these connections, what remains missing from the current scholarship is the subtle yet historically specific ways Heidegger indicates in the lecture courses how closely he is in dialogue with his times, especially when what is at issue is science, the production of scholarship, and the university.
Third, and most important, is the way Heidegger's two references to the "inner truth of National Socialism" are each framed by φύσις and the necessity of a new naming of Nature. As I have suggested, Heidegger's conceptual innovation is to think the creatively emergent power of Nature as originally poetic rather than biological. And, indeed, Heidegger is not alone in his effort to radically rethink Nature as the basis of politics. It is Arendt who, in seeking to provide a metaphysical alternative to totalitarianism as "motion," takes recourse to the Latin interpretation of Nature as natura-as the miracle and spontaneity of birth (natality)-in theorizing the political. This prompts what remains for me the deeper philosophical question posed by this discovery: If the political must be thought by way of Nature, as seems to be the case in the Western philosophical tradition, then a transformation in the essence of Nature will transform the political. How is the essence of Nature transformed through the naming force of φύσις? And how, thereby, is the political itself transformed? Not just in itself but precisely for us. How does the naming force of φύσις transform the political as the site of the existential structure of our Dasein?
